Gauging the Will of the People

According to the decree, there was to be one question on the ballot, and that had to do with whether you were for or against reviewing and re-writing the Constitution. During the weeks that followed, President Zelaya proposed holding a non-binding poll to gauge the mood of the public regarding the setting up of a fourth ballot box. He ultimately decided to hold the poll or encuesta on Sunday, June 28. On Saturday, June 27, the wording of the proposed encuesta was published in the government's official newspaper, La Gaceta. The wording, however, did not just mention setting up a fourth ballot box, but included a second question. That second question asked that if you favored a fourth ballot box, would you also favor the establishment of a National Constituent Assembly to undertake the process of reviewing and re-writing the Constitution. The Constituyente would supposedly consist of a more diverse representation of Honduran society.

With the publication of the encuesta text in La Gaceta, it became clear to members of the Legislative and Judicial branches of the Honduran government, as well as to Honduras' Attorney General and Armed Forces, that Mr. Zelaya was not simply moving to gauge the public's interest in a fourth ballot box on November 29, but in the same breath trying to gauge public support for a Constituyente.

The concern (... really, fear) was that President Zelaya would manipulate the encuesta to his advantage (particularly given that the encuesta ballots had been printed in Venezuela) and not only succeed in setting up a fourth ballot box, but also win a vote for convening a Constituyente even before November 29. The Constituyente could then be used to help diffuse opposition to the fourth ballot box from Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Attorney General.

Mr. Zelaya is correct when he has argued on numerous occasions that the encuesta was meant to be non-binding. The problem, as seen by the institutions that supported his overthrow on Sunday, June 28, is that the encuesta, if successfully manipulated by President Zelaya, would have given him the incentive and the excuse for moving to establish a Constituyente as a counter-balance against all those who opposed him.

The critical point to remember here is that President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela and President Rafael Correa of Ecuador had already established a model in which they successfully set up Constituyentes and granted to them full legislative powers, which the Constituyentes then utilized to dissolve both the Venezuelan Congress and Ecuadoran Congress.

If President Zelaya had chosen to follow this Chavez-Correa model, then Honduras by now would probably have a Constituyente with full legislative powers, and it is possible that this new legislature would have already attempted (perhaps successfully) to dissolve the Honduran Congress, making it very difficult to have blocked any creative maneuvers by President Zelaya to "work the system" to try and remain in power for an indefinite period of time... much the same way as Mr. Chavez has done and Mr. Correa is doing.

I think it is inaccurate to say that the political crisis in Honduras began on June 28. To be fair, I think you have to go back to at least March 23 when President Zelaya came out with his decree for la cuarta urna. How ironic that back then there was so much enthusiasm for the November 29 elections displayed by Mr. Zelaya's supporters. That fourth ballot box was seen as some sort of "silver bullet" that would initiate a process to change the Constitution and magically solve all of Honduras' problems of social and economic inequity and injustice. The upcoming elections no longer have the same appeal to those who were once so enthusiastic about letting the will of the people be heard.