Misreading Nuanced Diplomacy

In an interview with CNN on November 3, Mr. Shannon revealed that, although the US government still condemned the ousting of Mr. Zelaya and supported his reinstatement, it would respect the outcome of a vote on this issue by Honduras' Congress. The implication was that the Obama administration would not place any conditions on its support for the elections. It seemed a reasonable position to take, given that the Tegucigalpa-San José Accord placed no conditions or even timetables on the vote by Congress.

Then came US Ambassador to Honduras, Hugo Llorens, who a few days after the CNN interview, reaffirmed the position stated by Mr. Shannon. Finally, this past week Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Craig Kelly, reiterated the position again.

By opting to publicly announce to the world that the US government is now committed to the upcoming elections and, even more, sees them as the key to resolving the political crisis in Honduras, State Department officials have in one fell swoop eliminated the only leverage that Mr. Zelaya possessed to at least mildly influence the Micheletti administration and the Congress to being more amenable to his demands to be reinstated.

Almost overnight, Mr. Zelaya has awakened to find himself without the support that he imagined he has always had from the US. He must be asking himself, "Man, what in the heck just happened?" Mr. Zelaya feels blindsided, betrayed. But what I think really happened was that he thoroughly misread and overestimated the Obama administration's commitment to him from the very beginning.

If you look back at the record of remarks from State Department officials and spokespersons since July, you will see that consistently their line has been, "We support the re-establishment of the constitutional order in Honduras". Occasionally, the line would vary a bit and include something like, "We believe Mr. Zelaya should be returned to power", but you could feel that version was often being recited quickly and rather awkwardly, and almost never in the same sentence as comments related to the elections. The phrase "re-establishing the constitutional order" was practiced much more often, and you could tell that they were infinitely more comfortable to the person uttering them.

Mr. Zelaya chose to interpret the State Department's position in the manner that sounded most attractive to him, instead of trying to read in between the lines for what was subtly being conveyed. He should have started to catch on when State Department spokespersons began saying things like, "We do not support any one individual, but rather the return to democratic rule in Honduras".

As to the matter of the elections, the US government has never explicitly come out and stated that it would not recognize their results unless Mr. Zelaya were reinstated. What State Department officials and spokespersons have said repeatedly is that it would be difficult for the US to recognize the elections given "existing conditions" in Honduras out of concern that the process could not be undertaken in a transparent, fair, and inclusive manner. Existing conditions could mean anything from riots in the streets to repression of the media. It could also be taken to mean Mr. Zelaya being out of power... but not necessarily.

I sense that the problem for Mr. Zelaya has been his inability to grasp both the tone and content of the nuanced language that is used by the State Department under the Obama administration. It doesn't help either that Mr. Zelaya doesn't speak fluent English, and so the man is bound to miss stuff.

Technically, the US has been consistent in its policy toward Honduras. Its position has evolved, but it has not been reversed, as Mr. Zelaya now seems to believe. The evolution has occurred because the political situation in Honduras has superficially changed over the past two weeks, notably the signing of the Tegucigalpa-San José Accord -- an agreement which, although vaguely and poorly crafted from the standpoint of a conflict resolution plan, has allowed the US government to claim a foreign policy victory. (... I still cannot fathom what motivated Mr. Zelaya to sign a deal so detrimental to his cause...)

By getting the opposing sides to come together and work out their differences and then sign a piece of paper, the US government can congratulate itself and say that it has done its part, and that now the time has come for Hondurans to resolve amongst themselves the final loose ends of their family quarrel.

Mr. Zelaya has every right to feel that he has been tricked. His position is vastly weaker than it was two weeks ago. He can no longer count on the weight of the US government to try and influence events. And those such as Venezuela's Hugo Chavez and José Miguel Insulza of the OAS, who have more sincerely backed Mr. Zelaya, have been made irrelevant either by their own missteps or by US diplomatic maneuvering. But Mr. Zelaya is a grown man and a veteran politician, so the reality is that he has nobody to blame but himself.